Tariff protection and trade agreements by Leonardo Medrano
TARIFF PROTECTION 
AND TRADE AGREEMENTS 
Leonardo Medrano 
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas 
Resumen: El presente artículo analiza los cambios en los aranceles 
óptimos, sobre bienes importados del resto del mundo, 
cuando un club comercial acepta a un nuevo miembro. 
Muestra que cuando el club comercial es un Tratado de 
Libre Comercio, la aceptación de un nuevo socio da 
incentivos a los países miembros a reducir sus aranceles 
sobre bienes procedentes del resto del mundo. Sin em-
bargo, cuando se trata de una Unión Aduanera, la unión 
puede tener incentivos a incrementar el arancel externo 
común. Esto ocurre cuando la industria de la unión es 
pequeña en relación con la industria de los países que 
no son miembros de la misma. 
Abstract: This paper studies the optimal tariff rates on goods im-
ported from the rest of the world when a commercial 
club accepts a new partner. It shows that when a new 
member is accepted into the club, the other members of 
a free trade agreement have incentives to reduce tariffs 
on the rest of the world's goods. However, when the 
trade agreement is a custom union, the union may have 
incentives to increase the common external tariff. This 
happens when the industry of the custom union is small 
compared to the world industry. 
1. Introduction 
The formation of the European Union, EU, and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, NAFTA, is incomplete from several points of view. 
One of them is the process of acceptance of new countries as members 
of these Commercial Clubs, cc. Poland, Hungary, and other east Euro-
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pean countries have applied to be members of the EU and Chile is bar-
gaining to be a member of the NAFTA. An important reason for this de-
sire to belong to a cc is that non-member countries may face a greater 
difficulty when exporting to "a closer cc". This is because trade agree-
ments are by nature discriminators: lower tariff and non-tariff barriers 
are enjoyed only by the partner nations of the trade agreement. But, 
how does the entry of a new member affect the optimal tariff on imports 
from non-members? The objective of this paper is to answer this ques-
tion. 
We show that, in the context of a homogeneous-product Cournot 
oligopoly, a member of a Free Trade Agreement, FTA,
1 has incentives to 
reduce tariff on goods from non-member countries when a new mem-
ber is accepted in the agreement. However, when the trade agreement is 
a Custom Union, cu,
2 the Union may have incentives to increase com-
mon external tariff. This happens when the oligopolistic industry of the 
cu is small compared to the world industry. 
These results are related to Richardson (1993), who argues that a 
reason why most trade agreements do not contemplate common exter-
nal tariffs may be that member countries can partially avoid the cost of 
trade diversion
3 by reducing their external tariffs, while in a cu this 
autonomy is lost. Medrano (1998) extend this result under the assump-
tion of imperfect competition and shows that in a cu the cost of trade 
deviation can also be reduced. However, these works contemplate just 
two countries negotiating a trade agreement. 
Just as in the case of two countries, with several countries, the ac-
ceptance of a new member may divert trade due to the reduction of 
sales of goods from non-member countries. Then, as in Richardson 
(1993) and Medrano (1998), the incentive to reduce tariffs on goods 
from non-member countries arises to mitigate the negative effect of 
trade diversion. However, acu contemplates all member countries' firms, 
1 An FTA is formed by removing tariffs on trade among member nations and giving 
members autonomy in setting their tariffs on trade with non-member countries. 
2 A CU removes tariffs on trade among member nations and applies a common tariff 
structure to trade with non-members. 
3 Trade diversion arises because identical goods traded inside member countries 
face different tariffs, depending on whether their country of origin is a member or not of 
the trade agreement. A complementary definition is as follow: trade diversion arises 
when imports increase from a less efficient source. See Richardson (1993), El-Agraa 
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so the protectionist incentive
4 in a cu is greater than in a FTA and this 
incentive is greater the lesser the oligopolistic industry of the cu. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic 
model. Section 3 develops the optimal trade policy of a cu. Section 4 
develops the FTA case, and section 5 makes some concluding remarks. 
2. The Model 
We call a "commercial club" any kind of trade agreement among sev-
eral countries. There are two basic types: Custom Unions, cu, and Free 
Trade Agreements, FTA. Let M be the set of all countries and let C be the 
set of countries belonging to the commercial club. Let m be the number 
of countries in C. We examine the effects on one industry, an oligopoly 
producing a homogeneous good. In country i € M there are n. firms. 
The firms are owned by residents of the country in which they are 
located.The number of firms in the commercial club is 
n = n(m) = XI6C", and the total number of firms is N = YijeM n, . The 
product or good is produced from a numeraire. The production technol-
ogy shows constant returns to scale. All firms have the same unitary 
cost of production, c. The market of the good represents just a small 
part of the whole economy, so changes in this market do not affect 
other good prices and the income effects can be neglected. There are no 
initial endowments of the consumption good; thus, the firms must pro-
duce it. Initial endowments of numeraire belong to the representative 
consumer of each country.
5 
Under the assumption of partial equilibrium, we can develop a cuasi-
linear model with two goods: the consumption good and the numeraire. 
The representative consumer of country i e C has the utility function: 
ui(zi,y,) = vi{zi) + yi (1) 
where z denotes the consumption good, y. represents the numeraire and 
vf*) is an increasing function. The budget constraint is given by 
4 Brander and Spencer (1984) study the protectionist incentive trade policy. They 
show that tariff protection can shift some of pure profits (coming from imperfect compe-
tition) from foreign to domestic firms and, in addition, tariff can transfer foreign rents to 
the domestic may, CU treasury in the form of increased tariff revenue. 
5 For a discussion of partial equilibrium models see Mas-Colell, Whinston and 
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pZj+y^ 0).+ Y., where p. is the price of consumption good, ft), is the value 
o'f initial endowments of numeraire and Y. represents other sources of 
wealth. The FOC (First Order Condition), 'derived from the consumer 
utility maximization problem, is given by Pi = v,'(z;) which also repre-
sents inverse demand of the consumption good. Demand is linear, so, 
p\ = -A, where A. is a positive constant. Note that the greater A. the 
smaller the demand will be. 
We focus on the member country's market and ignore the market 
of the rest of the world.
6 Firms in a non-member country face a tariff 
rate t. for their exports to country ie C. Due to the assumption that the 
unitary cost of production is equal for all firms, there are just two kinds 
of firms: firms that belong to member countries and firms that belong to 
non-member countries. Profits of each kind of firm coming from sales 
in member countries are, respectively: 
n = la = 5>,--<:)*,• (2) 
n*=Xn,-*-c-t^ * (3) 
ieC ieC 
where IX and II* are profits coming from sales in country is C, x and 
x* denote quantities of the good produced to sell in country ie C. Com-
petition concept is Cournot. 
Since the consumer is the owner of the firms, and he/she receives 
tariff revenue,
7 the Y. value of the budget contraint, is given by: 
Y^^U+R, (4) 
where R. is the tariff revenue. From (1), (4) and the budget constraint, 
the country i welfare less initial endowments is given, by: 
W^Viiz^-PiZi+riiU+Ri (5) 
6 We are assuming that the market of the commercial club and market of the rest of 
the world are independent. 
7 In a CU all member countries share total tariff revenue according to some transfer-
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That is, the sum of net consumer surplus, firm profits and tariffs 
revenues. First we analyze the cu case. Later we analyze the FTA case. 
3. Custom Unions 
When the club is a cu, the tariff i applied to imports of the consumption 
good is common and we assume that is chosen to maximize the total 
welfare of member countries. Let t be the common tariff rate. We also 
assume that the market of the member countries is integrated. This im-
plies that the price is the same in all member countries. Let p be the 
common price and p = -A , where 1/A = XfeCl/A, . Note that A = A(w). 
Profits (2) and (3) become: 
U = (P-c)x (6) 
U* = (p-c-t)x* (7) 






R = (N-n)tx* (8) 
The welfare of the union is given summing up the welfare of mem-
ber countries: 
w = ^vidi)- pz + nU+(N-n)tx* (9) 
ieC 
where z = J^z,. = nx + (N - n)x * . Let t *=t(m) be the optimal tariff com-
ing from the maximization of (9). An implicit expression for t(m) is 
shown in the next lemm£i. 
LEMMA 1. TllC OptlJTXdl V&lliC oJ
,t(/n) IS QlVGfT by. 
t{m) = (2n(m) + l)A(m)x * (t(m),m) (10) 
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Expression (10) indicates that the optimal tariff rate is positive.
8 
The optimal change of t, due to the acceptance of a new member in the 
commercial club, can be approached computing the derivative of t with 
respect to m: t'(m). We take into account that a new member increases 
both the union market size, X'(m), and the number of firms in the union, 
n\m). In the linear demand case we assume that the increase in de-
mand implies a flatter slope. Before obtaining t'(m), we compute the 
partial derivatives of x and x* with respect to m: 
LEMMA 2. Let X'(m) = - a, a > 0, be the increase in the size of the cu 
market due to the acceptance of a new member (the change in the slope 
of the demand curves), and let n'(m) = r be the number of firms in the 
new country. Then, the changes in x, x* and z caused by this increase in 
m are given by: 
„_ja (2n + \)r 
' ~\X N + l 
2(n + \)a (2n + l)r| 




+ — \IX (13) 
PROOF. See Appendix. 
Note that the sign of zin is positive. This means that the acceptance 
of a new member increases'total output. However, the sign oix * and x 
in tn 
are ambiguous and would be positive if the size of the new member 
market, a, is big enough compared to its industry size and the industry 
size of cu. The change in t due to a change in m is given in the next 
proposition. 
PROPOSITION 1. The optimal change in t due to the acceptance of a new 
member in the custom union is given by: 
8 See Brander and Spencer (1984) for a similar result. TARIFF PROTECTION  223 
t'(m) = Akx*r 1 
4n(« + l) 
2N + 1 
(14) 
where k is a positive constant. 
PROOF. See Appendix. 
Proposition 1 indicates that when the number of firms in the cu is 
small compared to the total number of firms, the cu increases the tariff 
rate on goods imported from non-member countries. In the opposite 
case, the tariff is reduced. We will explain this result below. First we 
analyze the FTA case. 
4. Free Trade Agreement 
When the club is a FTA, each member chooses its own tariff rate to maxi-
mize its own welfare without taking into account the welfare of its part-
ners. We assume that the markets of the member countries are 
independent of each other. This assumption, together with the assump-
tion of constant marginal cost implies that equilibrium in market i is 
independent of the equilibrium of market;'; where i, j e C, and the prof-
its of country i's firms coming from sales in other countries are not 
affected by their government tariff policy. (See Dixit, 1984; Brander 
and Spencer, 1984). The tariff revenue is given by R = (N - n)tx *. The 
welfare, less initial endowments, is given by: 
The next lemma shows an expression for the optimal tariff coming 
from the maximization of (15): 
LEMMA 3. The optimal value oft.fm) is given by: 
= v, (z, ) - PiZi + «, IT, +(W - n)i,.x, *  (15) 
tt(m) 
(In; +l)A,x,. *(f,-(m),m) 
2(n(m)-ni) + l 
(16) 
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Differentiating t. implicitly with respect to m approximates the op-
timal change in t. due to the acceptance of a new member in the FTA. In 
this case, the change in market size, and in the profits of the new mem-
ber firms are not taken into account by the country i. The next proposi-
tion shows the result: 
PROPOSITION 2. The acceptance of a new member in a FTA provides the 
incentives to member countries to reduce the tariff on goods from the 
rest of the world, that is t.'<0. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
This result indicates that when a new country is accepted as a mem-
ber of a FTA, each member country has incentives to reduce tariff on 
goods from third countries, even if they have no trade agreements with 
them. The intuition of propositions 1 and 2 is as follows: the acceptance 
of a new member triggers two effects on the welfare of member coun-
tries. First, a trade creation effect because of the increase of sales of the 
new member's firms, and second, a trade diversion effect because of 
the reduction in sales from non-member countries. By reducing the tar-
iff rate the negative effect of trade diversion can be somewhat miti-
gated. However, since acu contemplates firms from all member countries 
and a greater market size, then the protectionist incentive in a cu is 
greater than in a FTA. That is, a greater tariff shifts more of the pure 
profits from foreign to member countries' firms. In addition, a tariff can 
transfer foreign rents to cu treasuries in the form of increased revenues. 
These gains are greater the greater the size of the non-member country 
industry. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper studies the optimal changes in tariff rates on goods imported 
from the rest of the world when a commercial club accepts a new part-
ner. It considers both, free trade agreements and custom unions. In the 
context of a homogeneous-product Cournot oligopoly, it shows that a 
member of a free-trade agreement has incentives to reduce its tariff on 
goods coming from non-member countries when a new member is ac-
cepted in the agreement. However, when the trade agreement is a cus-TARIFF PROTECTION 225 
torn union, the union may have incentives to increase the common ex-
ternal tariff depending on the size of the new member. These results are 
related to Richardson (1993), who argues that one reason why most 
trade agreements do not contemplate common external tariffs may be 
that member countries can partially avoid the cost of trade diversion by 
reducing their external tariffs, while in a cu this autonomy is lost. 
Medrano (1998) extends this result under the assumption of imperfect 
competition and shows that in a cu the cost of trade deviation can also 
be reduced. However, these works contemplate just two countries ne-
gotiating a trade agreement. 
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Appendix 
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. The FOC coming from profit maximization of (6) and 
(7) are given, respectively, by: 
p-hc = c Al 
p - Ax* = c +1 A2 
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Total output is given by: 
z = nx + {N-n)x* A3 
Solving for x and x* in Al and A2 and substituting into A3, we 
have: 
Np-Xz = Nc + (N-n)t A4 
Differentiating A4 with respect to t and solving for z, we get: 
z,=-^^- A5 
' (N + \)X 
Differentiating Al with respect to t and substituting A5 we obtain: 
X, = AO 
' (N + l)X 
. In a similar way, differentiating A2 with respect to t and substitut-
ing A5, we get: 
The FOC for welfare maximization given by (9) is: 
(n + \)t~  „, N-n 
W, 
N + \ 
nx + (n+\)x*--
X 
= 0 A8 





W„=-, " [2(n + \)
2+(N-n)]<0 
Thus, the solution to A8 is a maximum. Substracting Al from A2: 
X{x-x*) = t A9 
Solving for X in A9 and substituting into A8: 
x = 2(n+\)x* A10 TARIFF PROTECTION 227 
Similarly, solving for x in A8 and substituting in A9: 
i = (2n + l)Ax* All 
• 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2. Let/? = b - Xz be the inverse demand and A' (m) = -a 
the increase of the market size following the acceptance of a new mem-
ber. Then 
^ = -Xzm+az A12 
dm 





From the differentiation of Al with respect to m and substituting 
A12 and A'(m) = -a , then 
-Azm +az-Axm +ca = 0 A14 




In a similar way, by differentiating A2 with respect to m and substi-
tuting Al 3 we get: 
. ax* rt 
x„, — A16 
"' A A(A/ + 1) 
Substituting All into A13, A15 and A16 and solving for x*m,xm, 
and zm, respectively, we get the expressions (11), (12) and (13). " "• 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. The differentiate of (10) is given by: 
dx* 
t\m) = (2n + 1)(A + Ax*) + 2Ax * n\m) A17 
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dx * 
Solving for — we obtain: 
dm 
Ar * 
— = x,Y(m) + xl 
dm 
Substituting A7 and (11) into the above equation we get: 
dx* n + \ , fa (2« + l)rl 4 
-t+<- >x* A18  dm (N + l)X [A A/ + 1 
Substituting Al8, A'(m) = -a and n(m) = r into Al7 and solving 
for?', 
t\m) = klrx* 
where 
1 4n(n + \) 
2N+1 
A19 
2N + 1 
,V + 1 + (2n + l)(n +1) 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3. We focus on profits coming from sales in country 
IEC Profits of a member firm are given by: 
nf = (Pi-c)Xi 
And profits of a non-member firm are: 
n; = (/>,.-c-/,.)*; 
FOC for profit maximization are, respectively: 
Pi-XjXj=c A20 
Pi-Xix'=c + t' A21 
Total sales in market ieC are: 
Zi=nXi+(N-n)x* A22 TARIFF PROTECTION 229 
Differentiating with respect to /., 
zt, = nx„ +(N-n)x* A23 
Differentiating the FOCS (A20 and A21) respect to t. 
-A,z,,-A,.x,, =0 A24 
-kjZit -A,x;,* = l A25 
Solving the system of equations A23, A24 and A25 we obtain: 
N-n N-n * n + l 
X:, = — X;, * = — A26  ~" (N + l)Xt ' " (A' +1)A, ' " (A/ + 1)A, 
The FOC for welfare maximization (15) is: 
(2nf -n)x; + (n + l>x; *-ti(n + l)/Xt = 0 A27 
From A20 and A21 we have 
?, =A, (x,.-x, *) A28 
Finally, solving for x. in A28 and substituting into A27 we get (16). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. In this case, country i does not take into account 
the change in market size due to the acceptance of a new member. Then, 
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